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Raoul Berger's Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems is a
learned, distinguished, and timely book. There can be no doubt that
it will be widely read and relied upon. For that reason I should like
to voice some reservations about the arguments concerning impeach-
ments in Stuart England put forth in the first two chapters of the
book. It is the thesis of those chapters that impeachments in England
were not limited to previously existing treasons and criminal offenses,
that the House of Commons might rightfully impeach a person for
conduct that was not an indictable crime. Berger even implies in the
course of his argument that impeachments need not be limited to vio-
lations of the known and established law. My own earlier research on
Stuart impeachments,' however, leads me to a different conclusion: im-
peachments would lie only for a breach of the existing law.
Raoul Berger's first chapter concerns impeachment for treason, his
second chapter impeachment for high crimes and misdemeanors. In
both cases, he contends, impeachments need not be limited to pre-
viously existing criminal offenses. He claims that this is true as to
impeachments for treason because Parliament possessed an inherent
power to declare "retrospective" treasons, and might exercise that
power in a trial upon an impeachment. With respect to impeachments
for high crimes and misdemeanors it is true, he asserts, because Par-
liament created a new category of crimes, called "high crimes and mis-
demeanors," which were political, as distinct from private, crimes. I
question the truth of both of these assertions.
I
In his discussion of impeachments for treason Berger makes two
errors. One concerns his interpretation of the declaratory power it-
self, the other concerns his estimation of the willingness of Stuart
parliaments to allow the declaratory power to be abused, or even
t Professor of History, Ohio State University.
1. See generally C. ROBERTS, THE GROWiH OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT IN STUART
ENGLND (1966).
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used at all, in proceedings upon an impeachment. Let me examine
each of these issues separately.
To begin with the declaratory power, I cannot agree with Berger's
assumption-an assumption which informs the entire chapter-that
there was an inherent power in Parliament to declare to be treason that
which was not treason before. Throughout the first chapter Berger
calls declaratory treasons "retrospective treasons." Indeed, he entitles
his first chapter, "The Parliamentary Power to Declare Retrospective
Treasons." But the phrase "retrospective treasons" is an anachronism.
No Englishman in the 17th century, to my knowledge, ever used it.
They spoke of "declaratory treasons," of "constructive treasons," of
"common law treasons," but never of "retrospective treasons." The
phrase "retrospective treasons" suggests the creation of new treasons
and their application retrospectively (or "retroactively," as Berger
says2). But the idea that a court could create a new crime and apply
it retrospectively or retroactively was alien to the English view of law.
In the English view, courts interpreted and applied the existing law.
Parliament (more particularly, the House of Lords) was a court, the
highest court in the land, and as a court it interpreted and applied
the existing law.
The law of treason which Parliament and other courts applied had
its roots in both statutory and common law. The most important stat-
ute dated from 1350, when in the 25th year of the reign of Edward
III, Parliament passed a statute defining seven categories of crimes
that were henceforth to be regarded as treasons, including making
war against the King, compassing (plotting) his death, "violating" his
Queen (with or without her consent), slaying his justices, and counter-
feiting his coin.3 To this statute Parliament added a clause, a salvo,
saving to itself the power to declare offenses other than those enu-
merated in the statute to be treasons.4 Indeed, the effect of the salvo
was to delay the ordinary justices in the exercise of these rights until
Parliament had first declared its judgment. It seems clear to me that
the authors of the salvo, when they spoke of Parliament declaring
2. See, e.g., R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 7, 29, 52 (1973).
3. 25 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1350).
4. The SALvo reads:
And because that many other like cases of treason may happen in time to come,
which a man cannot think nor declare at this present time, it is accorded, that if any
other case, supposed treason, which is not above specified, doth happen before any
Justices, the Justices shall tarry without any going to judgment of the treason, till
the cause be showed and declared before the King and his Parliament, whether it
ought to be judged treason or other felony.
(As modernized in R. BERGER, supra note 2 at 8.)
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treasons, envisaged its proceeding in the same manner as the justices
did in the ordinary courts-applying the existing law, statutory and
common, to determine whether an act was treason, or a felony, or per-
fectly legal and guiltless. 5
Berger maintains that the salvo did not create, but merely recog-
nized the existence of, the declaratory power, a power that was in-
herent in Parliament. With this I agree. I also agree with Berger that
the authors of the salvo intended the House of Lords alone, not the
Lords and Commons, to exercise the declaratory power. I am even
inclined to agree that 1 Hen. IVO and 1 Mary7 did not repeal the
declaratory power. But I cannot agree, as Berger asserts, that the
declaratory power gave Parliament the right to create treasons and
apply them retrospectively. What it gave Parliament was the right to
declare that an offense was treason at common law or fell within the
purview of the treason statute.
To support his theory of retrospective treason Berger cites the wide-
ranging parliamentary accusations of treason in the late 14th century.
It is true that in 1388 and 1397 political passions led both the Lords
Appellants (baronial opponents of Richard II) and the supporters of
Richard II (who abetted that king in his absolutist pretensions) to
exercise the widest possible latitude in interpreting what constitutes
treason. In particular, Parliament declared "accroaching the royal
power," that is, the usurpation of royal power by a subject, to be
treason. But even in these cases, writes Samuel Rezneck, author of the
definitive study of declaratory treasons in the 14th century, "there
was no enactment of new treasons, but rather the revival and the
declaration of old treason by a parliament exercising a supreme juris-
diction."" The offense of "accroaching the royal power" was the most
common charge on which men were convicted in 1388 and 1397, and
was a familiar offense in English law. In 1348 the Commons peti-
tioned against the excessive use by the King of "accroaching the royal
power" as an accusation of treason. Rezneck concludes: "[I]t should
be remembered that even in the case of these trials [of 1388 and 1397]
5. J.G. Bellamy argues that it is possible but not certain that the common law of
treason continued in force after 25 Edw. III. J. BELLAMY, THE LAW OF TREASON IN
ENCLAND IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES 93-94 (1970). S.B. Chrimes is convinced that common
law treasons did survive the statute. Chrimes, Richard Ii's Questions to the Judges, 1387,
72 LAw Q. REv. 365, 383-85 (1956).
6. 1 Hen. 4, c. 10 (1399).
7. 1 Mary, c. 7, § 3 (1553).
8. Rezneck, The Early History of the Parlianzentary Declaration of Treason, 42 ENG.
HisT. REv. 497, 509 (1927).
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the underlying idea was that of law-finding rather than of law-making,
of judging rather than of legislating."9
In the 17th century, the period with which Berger is most concerned,
the proponents of the declaratory power certainly saw it as an instru-
ment "of law-finding rather than law-making." Parliament was to judge
whether an offense was treason by statute or common law, not legis-
late new treasons. Oliver St. John, Solicitor General and spokesman
for the Commons against the Earl of Strafford, declared: "The thing
most considerable in this, is, whether the treasons at common law
are taken away by the statute of 25 Edward III?"' And he answered
as follows: "My Lords, to say they are taken away by the statute of
25 Edward III is to speak against both the direct words and scope
of that statute."'1 He further urged that the Commons "did not in-
tend to make a new treason and to condemn my Lord of Strafford
for it.'
' 2
Sir Francis Winnington offered the same interpretation when jus-
tifying the use of the declaratory power against the Earl of Danby,
impeached in 1678 for helping Charles II to secure from Louis XIV
the money needed to govern without Parliament. There is "a declar-
atory power in Parliament to declare treason, see 25 Edward III,
[where it is] declared there are many other treasons not here set down,
so what was treason before was afterward treason."'13 Winnington made
his meaning yet clearer when urging in 1680 that Chief Justice Scroggs,
who allegedly had defamed witnesses and discharged grand juries,
should be impeached for treason: "And I am of opinion that any
thing that tends to the destruction or alteration of the government,
has always been, and ought to be declared in Parliament, treason, if
brought there to be judged. The Parliament does not in this make
new crimes, and then condemn them; but only declares that to be
a crime which was so before, and wanted nothing but condemnation."'.
4
Others spoke the same language. Sir William Jones, one of the most
brilliant lawyers of the age, declared in justification of Scroggs's im-
9. Id. at 510. Bellamy has shown that "accroaching" was not in fact treason at common
law, but was in a category of its own, between felony and treason. J. BELLAMY, supra note
5, at 62-74.
10. St. John, An Argument of Law Concerning the Bill of Attainder of High Treason
of Thomas Earl of Strafford, in 5 HARLIAN MISCELLANY 53 (2d ed. 1810).
11. Id. at 79.
12. Id. at 54. Strafford implicitly accepted the existence of common law treasons when
he declared: "Nothing charged against him could be made good to be treason, neither
by statute law nor common law." 4 H.L. JouR. 215 (1641).
13. Parliamentary Notes, Dec. 19, 1678, British Museum Additional Manuscript No.
28,046, f.20.
14. AN EXACT COLLECTION OF THE DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS [1680-1681], at
224 (1689).
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peachment that it "is treason at common law" for one in high place
to obstruct justice.1a Sir Harbottle Grimstone, who had witnessed from
his seat in the House of Commons the impeachment of three premier
ministers of state-the Earl of Strafford in 1640, the Earl of Clarendon
in 1667, and the Earl of Danby in 1678-declared in the debate on
Danby's impeachment: "Tis agreed there are treasons not in the Stat-
ute [of 25 Edward III], and they [are] reserved to Parliament."'16 And
Sir John Somers, the greatest lawyer of them all, who wrote the first
drafts of the Declaration of Rights and later became Lord Chancellor
of England, stated in 1690 during a debate on a new treason statute:
"The statute of 25 Edward III did forsee that men would be above
the law, and, I believe, did not take away those that were treasons
at common law."'' 7
In short, Parliament might declare an endeavor to subvert the fun-
damental law to be treason at common law, as the Commons urged
in their impeachment of the Earl of Strafford. Or Parliament might,
as the Commons also urged in Strafford's case, construe transporting
an Irish army to England as plotting the death of the King, and thus
treason under the first clause of 25 Edward III. But whether it was
declaring or construing or ruling, Parliament was interpreting an
existing body of law.
True, the House of Commons did on occasions so abuse the declara-
tory power that one may rightly say that it was attempting to create
new treasons and apply them retrospectively. But those accused, their
counsel, and the House of Lords successfully resisted such efforts. And
this brings us to the second of Berger's errors concerning impeach-
ments for treason, his assessment of the inclination of Stuart parlia-
ments to permit the declaratory power to be abused, or even used at all,
in proceedings upon impeachments. It is a grave defect in Berger's
first chapter that he gives the reader no idea how vigorously and
how effectively Englishmen in the 17th century opposed the abuse of
the declaratory power. His account of Strafford's attainder,"s his si-
15. 8 DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONs 285 (A. Grey ed. 1763).
16. Parliamentary Notes, Dec. 21, 1678, British Museum Additional Manuscript No.
28,046, f.175.
17. 10 DEBATES OF THE HousE OF COMMONS 210 (A. Grey ed. 1763).
18. An impeachment is a judicial process in which the Commons accuse and the Lords
try and, upon a finding of guilt, sentence the accused. An Act (or Bill) of Attainder is a
legislative process in which the Commons, the Lords, and the King declare they are satis-
fied that a person is guilty of a crime and impose upon him whatever punishment they
deem fit. An impeachment is governed by procedures similar to those found in a court
of law. An attainder is governed by procedures similar to those used in passing an
ordinary bill in Parliament.
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lence about Laud's, and his discussion of Clarendon's impeachment
offer three examples of this failure.
Berger declares that he is puzzled by the shift from impeachment
to attainder in Strafford's case, stating that he finds all attempts to
explain the shift unsatisfactory.' 9 This is surprising, for contemporaries
then and historians since have expressed no puzzlement about the
shift. They have attributed it to fear on the part of the House of
Commons that it could not prove its case before the House of Lords.20
The Commons in March 1641 had accused the Earl of Strafford,
Charles I's ablest and most ruthless minister, of two counts of treason
-that he had attempted to subvert the fundamental laws of England,
and had advised Charles to use an Irish, papist army against England.
But as the trial proceeded, the Commons grew fearful that they could
not make good their charges. There were two reasons for this uneasi-
ness: the Lords might refuse to accept the contention of the House
of Commons that an attempt to subvert the fundamental laws could
be declared a treason; and the Lords might demand, as the law re-
quired, two witnesses to the charge that Strafford advised the King
to bring over the Irish army, to which charge the Commons had but
one witness. The course of Strafford's trial made it abundantly clear
that the Commons moved to an attainder for these reasons, as was
expressly confirmed by St. John in his speech justifying the attainder.
2
1
Perhaps Berger is puzzled by the shift from impeachment to at-
tainder because he does not want to admit what the Commons evi-
dently believed-that the Lords would not accept declaratory treasons
in a trial upon an impeachment. Berger's total and unaccountable
silence concerning the impeachment of Laud confirms this. William
Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury and scourge of the puritans, served
Charles as loyally in the Church as Strafford did in the State. In
1640 the Commons impeached him for endeavoring to subvert the
19. R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 35.
20. For the views of contemporaries, see the letters of: Sir John Coke the Younger,
Apr. 17, 1641, in HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, TWELFTH REPORT app., pt. II, at
277-78 (1888) (2 Manuscripts of the Earl Cowper, K.G.); Sir John Temple to the Earl of
Leicester, Apr. 22, 1641, in 6 HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE MAN-
USCRIPTS OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE VISCOUNT DE L'ISLE, V.C. 400, 401 (1966); Nathaniel
Tomkyns to Sir John Lambe, Apr. 12, 1641, in 17 CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS 539, 540
(domestic ser. 1640-1641) (W. Hamilton ed., Public Record Office, 1967); the French am-
bassador, Apr. 15, 1641, in Public Record Office, French Transcripts; the Tuscan envoy,
Apr. 9, 1641, in British Museum Additional Manuscript No. 27,9621, f.213v. For the
explanations of historians, see G. DAVIES, THE EARLY STUARTS 1603-1660, at 100 (2d ed.
1959); C. FIRTH, THE HOUSE OF LORDS DURING TIlE CIVIL WAR 83 (1910); 9 S. GARDINER,
HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE ACCESsION OF JAMES I TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE CIVIL IrAR,
1603-1642, at 329-30, 335-38 (1884); J. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OF THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 1603-1689, at 95 (1962).
21. See St. John, supra note 10, at 55, 81.
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laws of England by licensing popish books, suppressing puritan preach-
ers, and forcing an Anglican liturgy on Scotland. Once again the Com-
mons relied upon the declaratory power Once again the accused
vigorously denied the validity of declaratory treasons. Once again it
seemed that the Lords would find the accused innocent of any trea-
son. The Commons therefore substituted an attainder for their im-
peachment.2 2 In the end, Laud's head fell upon the scaffold as Straf-
ford's had. But the deaths of Strafford and Laud offer no proof that
men could be impeached, convicted, and executed for declaratory
treasons. Quite the reverse, the fact that the Commons ift both cases
deserted their impeachments for attainders suggests that impeachments
based on declaratory treasons could not be successfully prosecuted. 23
Clarendon's impeachment in 1667 illustrates the disrepute into
which declaratory treasons fell after the Restoration-though Berger
concludes just the opposite. Berger writes of the vote to impeach Clar-
endon for treason: "Proponents of the declaratory power carried the
day. . .. 24 But a careful examination of the debates and votes in
the House of Commons shows this not to be true. The Earl of Clar-
endon was Lord Chancellor of England, a staunch friend of the law
and the King's chief minister. On the sixth of November 1667 the
personal and political enemies of Clarendon introduced into the
House articles of impeachment against him. Seventeen charges were
made, the most important of which waq that he had attempted to sub-
vert the laws of the realm by advising the King in June 1667 to
dissolve Parliament and to govern by a standing army. On the ninth
of November the opponents of Clarendon sought to persuade the
House that such advice was treasonous. Since no treason in 25 Edward
III covered such an act, the opponents of Clarendon fell back upon
the declaratory power, contending that Parliament could declare an
endeavor to subvert the law to be treason. But the country gentlemen
and cavaliers who crowded into St. Stephen's chapel that autumn day
refused to countenance this use of the declaratory power; by a vote
22. See II THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS (n.s.) 464-67 (1962).
23. Bulstrode Whitlocke observed that the Commons proceeded by attainder against
Laud "because they perceived the Lords not forward to give judgment for treason against
him." B. WHITLOCKE, MEMtORIALS OF ENGLISH AFFAIRS 110 (1732). For the Lords' scruples,
see 7 H.L. JoUR. 111 (1664). In 1641 the Commons also invoked the declaratory power to
impeach Justice Berkeley for treason for endeavoring to subvert the fundamental laws of
the realm. However, the lawyers in the Commons asked to be excused from managing the
trial, because they were "altogether unsatisfied of any treason in his case .... Letter
from Sir John Coke the Younger to Sir John Coke, May 14, 1642, in HISTOICAL MANU-
SCRIPTS COMMISSION, TWELFTH REPORT app., pt. II, at 314, 315 (1888) (2 Manuscripts of
the Earl Cowper, K.G.) In the end the Commons prosecuted him only for misdemeanors.
24. R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 43.
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of 172 to 103, they concluded that Clarendon should not be accused
of treason on such a charge. The next effort to invoke the declaratory
power came on the l1th of November, when Clarendon's enemies
argued that he had committed treason by advising the sale of Dunkirk
to France. But the Commons refused to accuse him of a declaratory
treason upon this charge, or upon any other nonstatutory charge that
day. They were willing to accuse him of misdemeanors on these
charges, but not treason. In desperation Clarendon's opponents amend-
ed Article 16 (a charge that Clarendon had corresponded with the
enemy) by adding the words "and discovered and betrayed his [the
King's] secret counsels to his enemies." Lord Vaughan, one of Claren-
don's leading opponents in the Commons, charged that Clarendon had
divulged to the French Court the King's resolution to send a con-
siderable English army to help the Spanish defend Flanders against
a threatened attack by France. To betray the King's confidences to
the enemy was clearly a statutory treason, so the House voted to im-
peach Clarendon for treason upon the 16th Article. 25 But this was no
victory for the declaratory power. It was in fact a victory for deceit,
for Lord Vaughan had no evidence to prove his charge. For that rea-
son the Commons never sent to the Lords particular charges against
Clarendon. Instead they stubbornly insisted that the Lords imprison
Clarendon upon a general charge. The Lords refused. 26
The scruples which the Commons displayed against the declaratory
power in 1667 melted away before the passions unleashed by the Popish
Plot, an alleged conspiracy by papists in 1678 to assassinate Charles
II and place his Catholic brother on the throne. In 1678 the Earl
of Danby, Lord Treasurer of England and Charles II's chief minister,
who had allegedly failed to conduct a thorough investigation of the
plot, was impeached by the Commons for the treason of arrogating
to himself regal power and endeavoring to subvert the Kingdom's an-
cient and well-established form of government. And in 1680 the Com-
mons used the declaratory power to impeach Chief Justice Scroggs
of treason for the old common law offense of obstructing justice. But
neither man ever came to trial. And herein lies another weakness in
Berger's thesis. His whole argument for retrospective treasons rests
upon the law as the prosecutor would define it. But prosecutors do
not define the law, judges do. This is as true for the law of impeach-
ment as for any other branch of the law. It thus belonged to the
25. 1 DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 29-37 (A. Grey ed. 1763).
26. J. MILWARD, DIARY 122-25 (C. Robbins ed. 1938).
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House of Lords to declare what was treason. As Paul Foley, a stalwart
opponent of the King, said in 1681: "[W]e only impeach, they [the
Lords] are to be judges, whether the matter be treason or no. ' 27 This
being the case, it is a matter of no little significance that not one
person in Stuart England was ever found guilty upon an impeachment
for a declaratory treason-not Strafford, not Laud, not Clarendon, not
Danby, not Scroggs, none. The Lords twice (under great pressure from
the populace) accepted declaratory treasons in bills of attainder, but
it is of the very nature of attainders that they are not governed by
ordinary judicial forms and precedents. Since the House of Lords in
Stuart England did not hand down a single judgment on the validity
of declaratory treasons in impeachments, the historian simply cannot
pronounce on their validity. Least of all can he deduce, as Berger does,
that impeachments in the 17th century were not limited to indictable
crimes.
II
The phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" plays the same pivotal
role in Berger's second chapter that "retrospective treasons" plays in
the first. He writes: "'High crimes and misdemeanors' were a category
of political crimes against the state, whereas 'misdemeanors' described
criminal sanctions for private wrongs."28 This crucial sentence raises
two issues, which should be examined separately: did persons in Stuart
England distinguish between political crimes and private wrongs? And
did they distinguish between "misdemeanors" as used in the phrase
"high crimes and misdemeanors" and "misdemeanors" as used in the
ordinary courts?
In the 17th century the English did speak of "private wrongs," but
never (to my knowledge) of "political crimes against the state," a
phrase redolent of an indictment in a people's democracy. The use
of the phrase "political crimes" is therefore incorrect.29 On the other
hand, persons in Stuart England did distinguish between a "public
offence" and a "private wrong." John Selden wrote in 1626, "Yet
complaints have ever been received in parliaments, as well of private
wrongs as public offences." 30 By a public offense Selden meant an
27. AN EXAcr COLLECTION OF THE DEBATES OF THE HoUSE OF COMMfONS [1680-1681], at
228 (1689).
28. R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 61 (emphasis in original).
29. See pp. 1432-38 infra for a discussion of the incorrect implication that "political
crimes" could be political actions which were not breaches of some existing law.
30. J. SELDEN, Of the Judicature in Parliament, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN SELDEN,.
EsQ. 1587 (1726).
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abuse of public trust, such as corruption on the part of a judge or
extortion by an official. Berger suggests that such offenses, which
were indeed charged in impeachment cases, were not statutory or ordi-
nary common law crimes, but were crimes by "the course of Parlia-
ment," the "lex Parliamentaria."31 The problem here is the absence
of references to the "lex Parliamentaria" in the many impeachments
for misdemeanors in Stuart England. I cannot remember seeing it in
articles of impeachment drafted during these years. The explanation
for this absence is not hard to find. The phrase "the course of Parlia-
ment" in the 17th century referred to those laws authorizing and
governing the proceedings of the two Houses in the exercise of their
judicial and legislative powers. The right of the Commons to initiate
money bills, the right of the Lords to hear appeals from the King's
Bench-these were aspects of "the course of Parliament"; the defini-
tion of corruption and extortion was not.
Yet Berger is right, though his terminology is inexact, to say that
public offenses were not necessarily statutory or ordinary common law
crimes (that is, crimes for which one could be indicted in the King's
Bench, Common Pleas, or the Exchequer). And historians must be in-
debted to him for raising a question which has been ignored too long:
by what law was it criminal to extort higher fees, intimidate witnesses,
or exceed one's warrant? The answer is obscure, but one approach lies
in the recognition that Parliament and the common law courts had no
monopoly over the making of law. Rather, English law was fed from
many sources. It was embodied in statutes passed by Parliament and
it was laid down by judges in the King's Bench, Common Pleas, and
the Exchequer. But royal commissions and prerogative courts also
created large bodies of judge-made law.
Special royal commissions issued by the King were of particular im-
portance in medieval times. As early as 1289 Edward I established a
Special Commission of Complaints in order to punish the "trespasses
done by the King's ministers." In the next four years it punished
judges for bribery, intimidation, and violence.32 Royal commissions
were also used by the Stuarts three centuries later. James I, for in-
stance, issued a commission in 1613 to inquire into frauds and deceits
in the navy, but this merely empowered the commissioners to search
31. R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 67.
32. STATE TRIALS OF THE REIGN OF EDWARD THE FIRST 1289-1293, at xxvi, xl-xli (T. Tout
& H. Johnstone eds., Royal Historical Soc'y Pubs., Camden 3d ser., vol. 9, 1906). I should
like to thank Frank Pegues for calling my attention to this special commission.
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out offenders. Once found they were to be referred "to the course of
justice as appertaineth." 33
The commission did not say what this course of justice was, but it
might be one of the prerogative courts-either a departmental court
or the Court of Star Chamber. A quarrel in 1613 over the jurisdiction
of the Earl Marshall's office demonstrates the respect of lawyers for
departmental courts. A pursuivant at arms had kept fees paid for
funerals, creations, and titles for his own use. His case was brought
before Chancery, but the defendant pleaded that the case ought to be
tried before the Commissioners for the Office of Earl Marshall. Sir
James Whitelocke, a redoubtable champion of the common law, chal-
lenged the authority of the Earl Marshall's office to try the case, but
only because the King had not empowered the office to act as a court.
He allowed that the King possessed the power to authorize the com-
missioners to act as a court, but argued that the King had not done
so. He pleaded that the case should go to Chancery, 34 but herein he
confused equity in civil cases, which was exercised by Chancery, with
criminal equity, exercised by the most famous of the prerogative courts,
the Court of Star Chamber. Under the Tudors and early Stuarts this
was the highest court for punishing public offenses (Parliament aside).
For example, under the "so called Star Chamber Act of 1487,"35 a
committee drawn from that court was given the power to punish men
in the King's own Household for maintenance (supporting unjust
claims in a court by violence or threats) and livery (keeping uniformed
retainers) 30 Other aspects of the court and its jurisdiction developed
case by case. In Henry VIII's reign, for instance, a bill of complaint
was brought in Star Chamber against certain Admiralty officials for
extortion.37 In James I's reign it found the Attorney General guilty
of a "Breach of Trust and Misdemeanor" for drawing up a Charter
for the City of London without a warrant to do so.3 The law defining
public offenses was, therefore, wider than statutory and ordinary com-
mon law; it comprehended also the judge-made law of royal commis-
sions and prerogative courts.
There is a certain ambiguity in Berger's thesis. He puts his position
33. J. WHITELOCKE, LIBER FAMILICUS 113-16 (J. Bruce ed., Camden Soc'y Pubs., vol. 70,
1858).
34. Id. at 34-37.
35. 13 Hen. 7, c. I (1486).
36. Pollard, Council, Star Chamber, and Privy Council under the Tudors, 37 ENG. HiST.
REV. 516, 526-27 (1922).
37. 2 SELECT CASES BEFORE THE KING'S COUNCIL IN THE STAR CHAMBER COMMONLY
CALLED THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER lv (J. Leadam ed., Selden Soc'y Pubs., vol. 25, 1911).
38. 3 H.L. JOUR. 125 (1621).
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this way: "I would maintain that history furnishes a plain answer to at
least one question that has long cluttered analysis: the test of an im-
peachable offense in England was not an indictable, common law
crime."3 9 If by a "common law crime" he means a crime for which a
man might be indicted before the King's Bench, Common Pleas, or
Exchequer, he may well be right. But if the phrase "common law" is
given a wider interpretation, if it is allowed to comprehend the lex
terrae or known law, including the judge-made law of the Star Cham-
ber, of the other prerogative courts, of royal commissions, even of the
House of Lords itself, then English history gives no such plain answer
to the question. Blackstone and Wooddeson clearly believed that the
violation of this known law was the test of an impeachable offense. 4°
It is unclear whether Berger also believes that it is. His discussion of
the meaning of "high crimes and misdemeanors" in Chapter Two
suggests that he does not, but that discussion is based upon a funda-
mental error.
Early in Chapter Two Berger chides Edward Christian for believing
that the phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" merely gives greater
solemnity to an ordinary charge of misdemeanor. "In this," Berger
writes, "he went astray. The phrase 'high crimes and misdemeanors'
is first met not in an ordinary criminal proceeding but in an im-
peachment, that of the Earl of Suffolk in 1386."'41 Berger later con-
tinues: "At the time when the phrase 'high crimes and misdemeanors'
is first met in the proceedings against the Earl of Suffolk in 1386,
there was in fact no such crime as a 'misdemeanor.' "42 He then goes
on to show that in 1386 crimes that would 150 years later be called
"misdemeanors" were called "trespasses." Thus a gap of 150 years
separates "misdemeanors" from "high crimes and misdemeanors."
It is an ingenious argument, but it is based upon a misreading of
the evidence. The phrase "high crimes and misdemeanors" was not
used in the Earl of Suffolk's impeachment in 1386, nor in that of
the Duke of Suffolk in 1450, as Berger states. 43 The Earl was accused
of "faults and misprisions," the Duke of "certain high treasons and
offences and misprisions." The phrase "high crimes and misdemean-
ors" appears nowhere in either impeachment. Berger seems to have
been misled by T.B. Howell, an early 19th century editor of State
39. R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 297.
40. See R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 55, 56.
41. Id. at 59.
42. Id. at 61.
43. Id. at 67.
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Trials, and by John Hatsell, a late 18th century editor of Precedents
of Proceedings in the House of Commons. Howell added the phrase
"high crimes and misdemeanors" to his introduction to the Earl's im-
peachment,4 4 which is cited by Berger on this point;45 Hatsell added
the phrase to his account of the Duke's impeachment, 46 which is also
cited by Berger.47 Had Berger consulted the Rotuli Parliamentorum
he would have discovered that no such phrase was used in the actual
impeachments." He further compounds his error when he asserts that
Attorney General Yelverton and Lord Treasurer Middlesex were im-
peached for "high crimes and misdemeanors." 49 They were not. This
is more of T.B. Howell's invention.50 My own research has led me
to the conclusion that the first use of "high crimes and misdemeanors"
occurred on 12 February 1642, in the impeachment of Sir Edward
Herbert. Before that date it was not used; thereafter it was regularly
used.51
The 150 year gap between "high crimes and misdemeanors" and
ordinary "misdemeanors" thus does not exist, but this does not in it-
self contradict Berger's contention that there is a functional division
between the two. It is therefore worth asking exactly how the English
used the word "misdemeanor" in impeachments. The answer is that
they used it carelessly, confusedly, prolifically, rhetorically, but nearly
always in its ordinary sense of a crime less serious than a felony.
Thus the House of Commons accused Middlesex of "bribery, extor-
tions, oppressions, and other grievous misdemeanors."52 It impeached
Buckingham for "misdemeanors, misprisions, offences and crimes," 53
and Sir Robert Berkeley of "high treason and other great misdemean-
ors." 4 In 1626 John Selden wrote a treatise on impeachments, in
which he argued that in all cases of felony and treason the accused
is denied counsel, but in cases of misdemeanor he may plead through
counsel.5 i (This rule, which seems strange under modern concepts,
44. 1 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 90-91 (T.B. Howell ed. 1809).
45. R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 59, n.21.
46. 4 PRECEDENTS OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 60 & n* (J. Hatsell ed.
1796).
47. R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 67 n.63.
48. 3 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM [Rolls of Parliament] 220 (1386); 5 id. at 177 (1450)
(The Earl's impeachment reads, in the original French: "pur les defautes & mesprisions
.The Duke's accusation reads in Latin "de quibusdam altis proditionibus, necnon
offensis & mesprisonibus .... "
49. R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 67.
50. 2 A CoMPLE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 1135, 1183 (T.B. Howell ed. 1809).
51. 4 H.L. JoUR. 582-83 (1642).
52. 3 H.L. JOUR. 383 (1626).
53. Id. at 619.
54. 4 H.L. JouR. 161 (1641).
55. J. SELDEN, supra note 30, at 1625-27.
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may have been an attempt to emphasize the heinous nature of the
first' two offenses.) The Earl of Strafford attested to this same three-
fold classification when he told the Lords that "if a thousand Mis-
demeanors will not make one Felony, 28 Misdemeanors could not be
heightened into Treason. . . ."5 The evidence suggests that "misde-
meanor" meant in the high court of Parliament what it meant in
the ordinary courts-a category of crimes less serious than felonies.
The important distinction in Stuart England was not between "mis-
demeanors" and "high crimes and misdemeanors," or between "po-
litical crimes" and "private wrongs." The important distinction was
between lawful and unlawful conduct as judged by the known law.
The Commons could rightly impeach a man for an illegal act, but
not for a legal one, however politically unwise, unpopular, inexpe-
dient, or unsuccessful. This is a distinction which Berger obscures. As
with his interpretation 6f treason, he develops a theory of political,
noncriminal impeachments based upon the actions of the Commons
without considering how unsuccessfully these charges were prosecuted.
The fact that a valid impeachment had to be for an illegal act
was strongly emphasized in the first 17th century impeachment in
1621. James I told the Commons in that year that he would not have
men accused "for mere error of judgment unless it were accompanied
with corruption." 57 The Commons heeded his command. They did
not impeach the King's councillors who had erroneously declared pat-
ents of monopoly to be legal and convenient. True, they did impeach
one member of this group, Sir Francis Bacon, but they impeached
him for taking bribes, not for his erroneous judgments.as They im-
peached Sir Henry Yelverton, the King's Attorney General, but for
illegally signing warrants dormants, not for his judicial opinions.59
In the 1624 impeachment of the Earl of Middlesex, James I's Lord
Treasurer, the Commons did overstep the boundary between lawful
and unlawful acts by accusing him not only of bribery and extortion
but also of advising the King to levy impositions on wines and sugar.
But the Lords refused to entertain the latter charge, and found Middle-
sex guilty only of the briberies and extortions.Y
56. 2 IMPARTIAL COLLECTION 54 (J. Nalson ed. 1683).
57. 5 COMMONs DrBATES 1621, at 94 (IW. Notestein, F. Relf & H. Simpson eds. 1935).
58. 3 H.L. JOUR. 106 (1621).
59. Id. at 77. From the context of Yelverton's impeachment, it appears that warrants
dormants gave authority to patentees and monopolists to arrest those who resisted their
authority.
60. Id. at 307-11, 379-81 (1624). Tite gives an excellent discussion of the Lords' caution
in accepting the accusations of the Commons. C. TrrE, IMPEACHMENT AND PARLIAMENTARY
JUDICATURE IN EARLY STUART ENGLAND 166-67 (1974).
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But the impatience of the Commons in 1624 proved a harbinger of
the future. In 1626 they impeached the Duke of Buckingham, Lord
High Admiral of England and the King's great favorite, for sending
an ill-prepared expedition to Cadiz, for neglecting to guard the Nar-
row Sea, for holding many offices, for accepting exorbitant gifts from
the King, and for prescribing a physic for James I. These were acts
of folly, but they were not crimes. Buckingham promptly drew up a
vigorous, full, and clear reply to the accusations against him. The
Tuscan envoy estimated he had the support of two-thirds of the
Lords. Charles I showed his favor to the Duke by naming him Chan-
cellor of Cambridge University. All of this drove the Commons to
add to their legal prosecution a political confrontation. They threat-
ened to vote a remonstrance demanding the Duke's removal, and to
refuse to grant further funds for the government until the King acted
on the remonstrance. When Charles heard that they were determined
to vote the remonstrance before the Bill of Subsidy, he dissolved
Parliament.0
Buckingham's impeachment proved to be a pattern for the next
century: the Commons would impeach men for their faults after
labeling those faults crimes, and then neglect to prosecute the im-
peachments before the Lords. This explains why, of 57 ministers,
judges, public officials, and clergymen impeached for "high crimes
and misdemeanors" (or a like charge) between 1626 and 1715, only
five were brought to trial and judgment. 2 Berger declares otherwise
when he writes: "Between 1621 'and 1725 there were fifty cases of
impeachments brought to trial.' ",03 The words quoted by Berger are
those of Sir William Holdsworth (though Holdsworth wrote "1715;"
not "1725"), 64 but the great Holdsworth himself erred egregiously.
To support his assertion that 50 impeachments were brought to trial,
Holdsworth cites Sir James Stephen's The History of Criminal Law,
I, 159. But what Stephen actually wrote on that page was this: "From
61. See Dispatches from the Tuscan envoy to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, June 5,
12, 19, 26, 1626, in HISTORIcAL MANUSCRIPTS COMMISSION, ELEVENTH REPORT app., pt. I, at
68, 70-75 (1887) (Manuscripts of Henry Duncan Skrine, Esq.)
62. The five who were impeached, tried, and judged were Roger Manwaring, Sir
Robert Berkeley, Baron Trevor, Sir Richard Gurney, and Henry Sacheverell. The Lords
fined Manwaring £1,000, suspended him from the ministry for three years, and imprisoned
him during the pleasure of the House. See 3 H.L. JOUR. 855 (1628). The Lords fined
Berkeley £20,000. See 6 H.L. JOUR. 211 (1643). Trevor was fined £6,000 and allowed to
continue as a Baron of the Exchequer. See 6 H.L. JOUR. 263 (1643). The Lords deprived
Sir Richard Gurney of his office of Lord Mayor and imprisoned him at the pleasure of
the House. See 5 H.L. JouR. 284-85 (1642). Sacheverell was suspended from preaching for
three years. See 19 H.L. JoUR. 1216 (1710).
63. R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 7 n.l.
64. 1 NV. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 382 (3d ed. 1922).
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that date [1621] to the present day there have been fifty-four im-
peachments, so far as I have ascertained from the calendar to the
Lords' Journals."015 Stephen did not say that these impeachments were
brought to trial; Holdsworth added this piece of misinformation and
misled Berger."" Impeachments could' be sent to the Lords without
ever being prosecuted, just as they could be voted without later being
sent to the House of Lords at all. It is time to set the record straight:
the great majority of impeachments voted by the Commons were never
brought to trial before the Lords.
The reasons were many why the Commons did not prosecute their
impeachments: the dissolution of Parliament, the outbreak of civil
war, the flight of the accused. But the chief reason was their unwill-
ingness, once the political advantage of voting an impeachment had
been gained, to put the charges to a test before the Lords. In 1641,
for example, the Commons voted impeachments against the six judges
who ruled in favor of Ship Money (a tax imposed by royal prerogative
on all the counties of England); they then voted two weeks later that
the impeached judges should not be in the Commission of Oyer and
Terminer for the next Assize. On 20 July 1641 they impeached Bishop
Wren, and the next day voted that he was unfit for office and asked
the King to remove him. In August 1641 they impeached 13 bishops
for passing canons without submitting them to Parliament, then in
October asked that they be removed from the House of Lords. The
Commons were not anxious to prosecute any of these impeachments.
Sir Symonds D'Ewes, a member of the House of Commons, confessed
that their slowness in proceeding against the judges "was a delay that
we would judge a scandal in any other court." 7 Despite repeated
urging by the Lords, the Commons prosecuted only two of the six Ship
Money judges. Nor did the bishops come to trial. On 11 August the
Lords informed the Commons that the charge against the 13 Bishops
was too general. The Commons thereupon sent up the same charge
again, but accompanied by a copy of the canons that allegedly con-
tained statements contrary to the fundamental laws of the realm. To
the second charge 12 of the 13 Bishops entered a demurrer on 19 No-
vember 1641. The Commons never replied to the demurrer, even
65. 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 158-59 (1883). Stephen
was in error when he said there were 54 impeachments voted between 1621 and the time
at which he wrote. There were 225 by my count in the Journals of the House of Commons
and the House of Lords (1621-1805).
66. W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 64, at 382.
67. British Museum Harleian Manuscript No. 163, f.368v, July 1, 1641.
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though the Lords in March 1641 urged the lower house to proceed
with all their impeachments.05
The same pattern emerged after the Restoration. The Commons
impeached Sir William Penn in 1668, but only in order to dissuade
Charles from sending him to sea again. They did not prosecute the
impeachment. 69 In November 1680 the Commons impeached Sir
Francis North, but made no move for two months to send up articles
against him to the Lords.70 In December they impeached Edward
Seymour and pressed hard for his commitment, "the chief design of
the impeachment being [in his brother's words] to have a pretence
to move him from the King's ear .... ,"71 The strategy of voting im-
peachments for purely political reasons did not always work. In 1675
the enemies of the Earl of Danby introduced an impeachment against
him in the House of Commons, only to be met with John Maynard's
objection: "Illegal and inconvenient are things very different, and
are different questions. ' 72 The House refused to vote the impeachment.
Among the most instructive examples of impeachment for high
crimes and misdemeanors are those voted in 1701 against Somers, Hali-
fax and Orford. They are instructive because they contain charges
which Berger cites73 to establish his category of "political crimes."
Among the charges are putting a seal to an ignominious treaty, sup-
porting pernicious and dishonorable measures and receiving exorbitant
grants. Now these actions, though inexpedient, were not unlawful.
Yet the Commons did include them in their impeachments; as well
they might, for they had little intention of prosecuting those im-
peachments. On the very morning after the impeachments were voted
the Commons voted addresses to William III asking him to remove
the three lords from his council and presence forever. Then they let
their impeachments lie. The Lords, however, did not; they prodded,
urged, and pressed the Commons to action. Finally the Lords set a
day for the trials. Sir Christopher Wren prepared Westminster Hall
for the scene. The Lords summoned the Commons to appear. But the
68. 4 H.L. JouR. 359, 363, 436 (1641); 2 H.C. JouR. 251, 493 (1641).
69. Samuel Pepys wrote that Penn's answer was sent to the Commons, "but they have
not yet read it, nor taken notice of it, so as, I believe, they will by design defer it till
they rise, that so he, by lying under an impeachment, may be prevented in his going to
sea...." S. PEPYs, DIARY 497 (E. Rhys ed. 1927) (entry for Apr. 29, 1668).
70. R. NORTH, EXAMEN 553-54 (1740).
71. Letter to Sir Edward Seymour from his son, Dec. 18, 1680, in HISTORICAL MANU-
SCRmIS CO.MsMISSION, FIFTEENTH REPORT app., pt. VII, at 107 (1898) (Manuscript of the
Duke of Somerset).
72. DE13ATES OF THE HOUSE OF CoMziofqs 62 (A. Grey ed. 1763).
73. R. BERGER, supra note 2, at 69-71.
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Commons did not appear, probably because they did not believe that
they could prove these acts unlawful. As the Dutch envoy wrote,
The committee which is charged with the task- of drawing up
articles of impeachment finds itself very embarrassed, not discover-
ing in the two Partition Treaties any matter for their articles,
so it is said they desire to have recourse to other subjects, which
they will intermix with the former, and thereby embroil matters
further; for they see clearly that the [three] lords, being innocent,
will have no difficulty absolving themselves. They have resolved
therefore not to push for a judgment.74
A similar episode occurred on 1 July 1717, as the ddnouement of
the impeachments voted in 1715 against four Tory lords, Oxford, Bo-
lingbroke, Ormond, and Strafford. A Whig House of Commons threw
a mixed-bag of alleged treasons and misdemeanors against them. Bo-
lingbroke and Ormond, who had corresponded with the Pretender,
fled; Strafford and Oxford, who had not, remained. For two years the
Commons postponed their trials. Once again the Lords demanded that
the Commons prosecute their impeachments. Aware that they could
not prove Strafford guilty of any misdemeanors, the Commons dropped
his impeachment. Oxford had been impeached both for treason and
for high crimes and misdemeanors. The Lords asked the Commons
to proceed with the charge of treason before that of high crimes and
misdemeanors. The Commons, however, possessed no evidence to prove
this allegation, so when summoned to the trial on 1 July 1717 they
declined to appear. A Tory then proposed that Oxford be discharged
of the treason charged against him, but the leader of the Whigs moved
that he be discharged of all charges, misdemeanors as well as treasons.
The Lords readily consented and the Commons acquiesced.7 5
The conclusion to be drawn from this series of events is manifest:
the House of Commons did seek to create a category of political of-
fenses which were not violations of the known law. Berger is quite
right to draw our attention to this fact. But the House of Lords reso-
lutely opposed this theory of impeachment. The Lords opposed it be-
cause they found it intolerable that anyone should be punished for
74. British Museum Additional Manuscript No. 17,677 WW, ff.234v-35, Apr. 7, 1701.
The French ambassador and the envoy of the Great Elector agreed that the Commons had
no intention of prosecuting their impeachments. Public Record Office, French Transcripts,
June 9, 20, 1701; British Museum Additional Manuscript No. 30,OOOE, ff.233-34, June 3,
1701.
75. W. HARLwIcK, THE HISTORY OF THE THIRD SEssioN OF THE PRESENT PARLIAMENT
76-79, 81-83 (1717).
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lawful acts, however unpopular, unwise, or unsuccessful. Berger de-
votes many pages to the charges drawn up by the prosecution, but
none to the pleas of the beleaguered defendants. Had he examined the
arguments of the accused he would have found no category of political
offenses. Buckingham said in his own defense: "Whilst I defend my
innocency I will not maintain that I have not erred."76 Strafford de-
clared, "My Lords, it is hard to be questioned upon a law which can-
not be shewn . . . . Do not put, my Lords, such difficulties upon
ministers of state, that men of wisdom, of honour, and of fortune, may
not, with cheerfulness and safety, be employed for the public."77 In
his defense Justice Berkeley cited a statute of 18 Edward III declaring
it to be punishable for a judge to give an erroneous judgment, if
done wilfully, maliciously, or for bribes and corruptions; and sub-
mitted respectfully that he had done none of these.78 Laud reminded
the Lords that not a single witness had yet charged him with over-
throwing the laws, and declared that he had done nothing that his
predecessors had not done in the reigns of King James and Queen
Elizabeth.79 Lord Somers admitted he placed the Great Seal to a
treaty with blanks therein, "which he conceives, and is advised, he
might lawfully do . . ."80 He also acknowledged that he received
grants of land from his Majesty, "and he humbly conceives, it was law-
ful for him so to accept the same."81 But no one expressed more elo-
quently than the Earl of Oxford the injustice of impeaching people
for mere faults:
If there was a fault [in negotiating the Treaty of Utrecht], it is
only an error in judgment, of a thing lawful. A man must not be
criminal, because another person judges better or otherwise
than he when there is no fraud, no corruption objected . ..
Infinite are the errors and evils which are not punished by law,
especially in public counsels and acts of government, but these
are tolerated evils arising from the necessity of things, and the
defects of human nature, and to punish them without law will be
a remedy worse than the evil, will deprive princes of ministry and
council, and will leave the body politic without arms to act, nor
feet to move, without eyes or ears to inform the understanding.
8 2
76. H. ELSING, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS [1624, 1626], at 189 (S.
Gardiner ed., Camden Soc'y Pubs. (n.s.), vol. 24, 1879).
77. 2 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 747-48 (V. Cobbett ed. 1807).
78. 5 H.L. JOUR. 82 (1642).
79. 1 THE HIsroRY OF THE TROUBLES AND TRYAL OF WILLIAM LAUD 271 (H. Wharton ed.
1695).
80. 5 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 1282 (W. Cobbett ed. 1809).
81. Id. at 1284.
82. British Museum Loan (Portland Papers) 29/10, No. 8, Sept. 7, 1715.
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The Lords discharged Oxford from all the treasons and misdemea-
nors charged against him, and the Commons never again sought to
transform "high crimes and misdemeanors" into a category of political
crimes. Berger rightly perceives the political character of many of the
high crimes and misdemeanors voted by the House of Commons, but
he errs in not pointing out that the House of Lords successfully re-
sisted this development. Berger writes: "Not all of the cited impeach-
ments eventuated in verdicts of guilty by the House of Lords. Some
did result in convictions . . . . 3 His language is unacceptably vague.
The fact is that the House of Lords between 1621 and 1715 found
29 men, in public and private life, guilty of high crimes and misde-
meanors (or an equivalent charge). But of these 29 men, five were
accused of bribery or various forms of extortion (Mompesson s 4 Ba-
con,85 Mitchell,8 6 Yelverton,87 and MiddlesexS), eight of trading with
the enemy in time of war (John Goudet and seven others in 169889),
two of preaching seditious sermons (Manwaring8 ° and Sacheverell 91),
and one of slandering the King and Queen of Bohemia (Floyd in
1621).132 Their offenses were crimes punishable in the ordinary courts
of the land. The "crimes" of the other 13 men, however, were of a
political character. Justice Berkeley93 and Baron Trevor" had ruled
in favor of Ship Money. Richard Gurney had proclaimed Charles I's
Commission of Array95 and George Benyon had circulated a petition
against the Militia Ordinance.96 Northampton and eight other Lords
had refused to attend the House of Lords in 1642.97 But it was a
rump House of Lords that found these 13 men guilty-a rump com-
posed of some dozen peers, puritan and radical, with all the royalist
peers absent. On this one occasion, amidst revolution, in the years
1642 and 1643, the Lords punished men for political crimes, but they
never did so again in the 17th century, or in any other century. The
Lords, whose judgments shape the law of impeachment, were no
83. R. BRGER, supra note 2, at 72.
84. See 1 H.C. JOUR. 533 (1621) (charges); 3 H.L. JOUR. 72 (1621) (judgment).
85. See 1 H.C. JouP. 560-61 (1621) (charges); 3 H.L. JOUR. 105-06 (1621) (judgment).
86. See 1 H.C. JOUR. 536-49 (1621) (charges); 3 H.L. JoUR. 108-09 (1621) (judgment).
87. See 1 H.C. JOUR. 536-49 (1621) (charges); 3 H.L. JOUR. 123-25 (1621) (judgment).
88. See 1 H.C. JOUR. 767-68 (1624) (charges); 3 H.L. JOUR. 124-25 (1624) (judgment).
89. See 12 H.C. JOUR. 271-72 (1698) (charges); 16 H.L. JOUR. 339 (1698) (judgments).
90. See 1 H.C. JOUR. 897 (1628) (charges); 3 H.L. JOuR. 853-55 (1628) (judgment).
91. See 16 H.C. JOUR. 257-58 (1710) (charges); 19 H.L. JOUR. 121 (1710) (judgment).
92. See 1 H.C. JouR. 600-01 (1621) (charges); 3 H.L. JOUR. 134 (1621) (judgment).
93. See 2 H.C. JouR. 162 (1641) (charges); 6 H.L. JOuR. 211 (1643) (judgment).
94. See 2 H.C. JOUR. 194 (1641) (charges); 6 H.L. JOUR. 263 (1643) (judgment).
95. See 2 H.C. JouR. 647 (1642) (charges); 5 H.L. JOuR. 284-85 (1642) (judgment).
96. See 2 H.C. JOUR. 489 (1642) (charges); 4 H.L. JOUR. 705 (1642) (judgment).
97. See 2 H.C. JOUR. 623 (1642) (charges); 5 H.L. JoUR. 222-23 (1642) (judgment).
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readier to accept "political crimes" than they were to accept "retro-
spective treasons." They were determined that men, whether im-
peached for treason or for high crimes and misdemeanors, should be
charged with violating the known law of the land.
Raoul Berger set himself a difficult task. History, as he himself
recognizes, rarely gives clear answers. Especially is this true when the
questions posed are about an ambiguous law of impeachment in a
distant century. It can be said, however, that Berger's own work has
contributed signally to the illumination of that law. He has shown
how ready the Commons were to invent new treasons by abusing the
declaratory power and how willing they were to create new crimes
by distorting the concept of high crimes and misdemeanors. But he
has failed to see how determined were the King's ministers and the
House of Lords to prevent these abuses. The Lords, the judges before
whom impeachments were tried, possessed the power to decide what
offenses were rightfully grounds for finding a person guilty. Because
they found it intolerable, as Oxford found it intolerable, that men
should be punished for what is not clearly prohibited, they chose to
limit those offenses to a violation of the known law of the land.
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